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ABSTRACT 
Monetary policy has been one of the least understood and much debated topics 
economic histonan from the larger suD|eci oí i.o»« rel«rion«hÍD 
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naive experiments with die real bilis doctrine provided the economy w d , financal 
stability. 
SUMARIO 
batidos de la historia económica chilena. La acepucion respecto 
bilidad ha alienado a los historiadores económicos de "" ^ « = ^ " 4 3 ? . ,^ " ^ 
de los costes y beneficios de los r^-^^^^^^^'^^;^': ^t^lfZTe 
de creación de dinero en Chile y su relación con Us « « T " * * ^ ^ ^ -ue la adop-
los bancos. Dadas las car-cterisdcas de a ^ o ^ « c^ ^^ ^^ ^^  £ 
don del patrón oro no era posible y que os " ^ " " ^ 
los real bilis permitió alcanzar cierta estabihdad financiera. 
. j onnnvmous referees provided with helpful suggestions. Any 
* Pablo Martín Aceña and two anonymous rererce» y 
remaining errors are of my own. 
Revista de Historia Económica 
Año XV. Invierno 1997. N'l. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy is one of the least understood topics in Chilean econ-
omic history; although its likely impact has been much debated. The histori-
cal debate concentrates only on a narrow monetary aggregate: the amount of 
fiscal notes in circulation and lacks a clear understanding of the monetary 
transmission mechanism as well as the functioning of commercial banks as 
money creators. An ideological commitment to convertibihty has ahena-
ted economic historians from the larger subject of the costs and benefits of 
different monetary and exchange rate regimes, thus creating the impres-
sion that monetary policy was one of the country's big failures during this 
period. 
The aim of this paper is to give a general view of Chilean monetary his-
tory during the XIXth century and the first quarter of the XXth century. 
This paper studies the evolution of different monetary aggregates —mone-
tary base, money supply and credit— as a result of relationship between 
policy makers and the banking community. It also studies the relationship 
between the monetary aggregates and the general price level, the domestic 
interest rate, the spread between the latter and the International one and the 
exchange rate. 
There are few recent works on Chilean monetary history: Lueders (1968), 
A Monetary History of Chile: 1925-1958, and Zahler et al. (1979), Estadisticas 
Monetarias de Chile: 1940-1975, do not include the period covered by this 
paper. Among contemporary histories, the most interesting are Subercaseaux 
(1922) Monetary and Banking Policy of Chile, Fetter (1931) Monetary Inflation in 
Chile and Santelices (1900) Bancos de Emisión. These works share three defi-
ciencies: (1) a narrow definition of money, which includes only fiduciary cur-
rency in circulation, (2) a view of the money market in isolation that does not 
allow to see the difference between open market operations and déficit financ-
ing and (3) a difficulty in seeing banks as financial intermediarles trying to set 
their portfolio so as to maximize profits, thus implying the lowest possible 
reserve ratio. 
The paper has six chronologically organized sections and a final section 
with conclusions. The second section describes monetary developments until 
1878. The third section studies the period 1879/80 until 1894. The fourth sec-
tion describes the ill-fated return to convertibility of 1895. The fifth section 
deals with the policies adopted fi-om 1898 until 1908. The sixth section runs 
ft-om 1909 until 1925. The final section sums up the conclusions of the 
paper. 
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2. THE GOLDEN PESO: 1818-1878 
Chile inherited from Spain the colonial bi-metallic standard; after Indepen-
dence in 1818 the Mint continued coining silver and gold pesos according to 
colonial weightL Monetary Laws of 1832 and 1834 established the metallic contení 
of the silver peso in 24.43 grams of fine silver and that of the gold peso in 1.48 
grams of fine gold, implying a ratio of 1:16.51; however in Europe the same ratio 
was 115 72. In other words, the Chilean Mint undervalued silver with respect to 
Europe; consequently, silver coins were driven out of circulation Monetary 
Laws of 1851 and 1860 slightly reduced the metallic content of the silver peso to 
22.5 grams of fine metal and that of gold to 1.3725 grams of fine metal. The new 
price of gold was 1:16.39, still below the market rate: 1:15.25 at the time. The par 
exchange rate between the Chilean gold peso and the pound sterling was 5.335 
pesos or forty-five pence. Although there are detailed statistics on the activity of 
L Mint since colonial times, the stock of coins in circulation is unknown; since 
1844 it is possible to calcúlate changes in the stock of coins because there are 
figures on coinage as well as imports and exports of numeraire, unfortunately 
coin exports were taxed, therefore the available figures are not reliable^ 
Banks did not opérate until the 1850s and those established then, d ^ no 
have the right to issue notes. However, the economys - P ' ^ ¿ ^ opm n 
raised the demand for money: contemporary businessmen c aimed that the 
lack of fiduciary currency was a major hindrance for the ^onntrys^^^ác-
velopment They argued that metallic currency did not have sufficient elas-
; t T o accomm'odate the growing financ^l needs of the - 0 0 ^ . A^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
discussion, on July 1860, Congress passed a bill authonzing he es tb lsh t 
of banks of issue. According to the law, banks could issue notes upto ^50 per^ 
cent of their paid-in-capital and reserves, notes were redeemable on demand 
n gold orsíver currency, otherwise they became executive orders against the 
in gold or siiver curici.v-j-, ctockholders. Note ssue had to be 
bank's assets and the personal wealth of ctockholders. 1 L A/t- * . „^ Kanlc! had to submit monthly balances to tne iviin 
registered at the Mint and banks nao 10 *"" 
• r e - TUic low pstablished a system of competitive banks ot issue, istry of F - - " - J h ' ^ ' ^ J " ' s i t - r e s e r v e ratio to the banks' management. kaving note backing and the depos.t ^.^^ ^^^ ^.^^ ^^^^ ^^ .^ 
These liberal P - s - s " d toJ,e con.d ^^^^J^.^^.^.^ 
X r p i : a i ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^  of issue multiplied in number and the 
Atter the passage 01 narticularly since 1866, as shown in Table I. 
volume of their operations soared, P^^'^^'^^^^ consequence of two fortui-
This extraordinary development c a - about a con^q ^^ ^^^ ^.^^ ^^ 
tous events: (1) the J^^ ^^^^^^¡^^^^^^^^^ expenses gener-
ver mine of Caracoles in l»/u. 10 mía 
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ated by the war, the government secured a loan from a syndicate of domestic 
banks; one of the loan's condition was the government's acceptance of notes 
issued by the participating banks in payment of taxes and dues. From 1860 to 
1866, the government had been adamant in demanding specie for these pay-
ments, by accepting bank notes paper currency became de jacto legal tender '. 
Consequently, the public substituted the more convenient paper notes for 
coins; banks were eager to satisfy this exogenous increase of the demand for 
paper currency. Table I shows that from 1865 to 1870 bank notes multiplied 
2.86 times and deposits 8.34. 
TABLE I 
Expansión ofCommercial Banking: 1861-1878. 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances at December 31) 
Year 
1861 ... 
1862 ... 
1863 ... 
1864 ... 
1865 ... 
1866 ... 
1867 ... 
1868 ... 
1869 ... 
1870 ... 
1871 ... 
1872 ... 
1873 ... 
1874 ... 
1875 .. 
1876 .. 
1877 .. 
1878 .. 
SOURCE: 
Assets 
Specie 
Reserve 
1,377 
561 
1,129 
745 
596 
4,447 
3,122 
3,312 
2,104 
2,421 
n.a. 
4,656 
4,424 
5,148 
4,785 
3,645 
4,639 
3,449 
Loans 
4,954 
4,464 
5,097 
5,484 
6,788 
8,104 
15,178 
21,402 
28,185 
26,648 
n.a. 
48,092 
55,837 
50,804 
53,946 
56,401 
59,051 
56,383 
Deposits 
2,745 
2,589 
2,567 
2,816 
2,482 
9,496 
15,849 
19,163 
21,492 
20,691 
n.a. 
37,672 
41,887 
36,714 
38,325 
38,686 
41,202 
37,173 
Liabilities 
Bank 
Notes 
136 
268 
259 
214 
1,538 
2,372 
3,674 
3,923 
4,635 
4,400 
n.a. 
7,157 
7,617 
7,375 
8,632 
8,991 
8,154 
8,349 
Net 
Worth 
2,080 
1,037 
1,040 
1,046 
899 
3,472 
4,483 
5,452 
6,256 
8,068 
n.a. 
12,810 
18,251 
18,483 
19,617 
22,136 
20,634 
20,610 
A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy: 1860-1925, Appendix C. 
Specie Res 
Specie/ 
Bank 
Notes 
10.125 
2.093 
4.359 
3.481 
.388 
1.874 
.850 
.844 
.454 
.550 
.651 
.581 
.698 
.554 
.405 
.596 
.413 
erve Ratio 
Specie/ 
Bk Notes+ 
Deposits 
.477 
.196 
.400 
.246 
.148 
.375 
.160 
.143 
.081 
.096 
.104 
.089 
.117 
.102 
.076 
.094 
.076 
' By defacto legal tender we mean that there was no law forcing the use of paper currency. In the 
course of the next four years the government began to accept notes issued by any bank. 
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The boom provoked by the discovery of Caracoles was without precedents in 
the Chilean economy, historians describe the years 1870 to 1875 as a penod of 
frenzy speculation. Figures in Table I do not contradict them: credit multiphed 2 
times, deposits 1.9 and bank notes 2 times during those six years. 
This extraordinary growth of banking activities was on shaky grounds. A mon-
etary system with convertible currency and without a central bank requ.res banks 
of issue to keep an appropriate level of bullion reserves ready to fence of pames 
and crises. Here, however, the ratio of specie holdings to bank notes and that of 
specie holdings to bank notes plus deposits fell continuously from 1861 up to the 
first semester of 1878. The share of specie holdings in total assets fell con..nuous y: 
the average for the period 1861-1868 was 16.1 percent that for the Pe"od 1869Uo 
1877 was 7.5 percent, and it was only 5 percem in the fírst semester of 1878. This 
low level of specie reserves made Chilean banks particularly vulnerable to exter-
nal crises. Balance of Payments problems were bound to turn mto financial cnses 
as happened in the late 1870s. ^, . r . „^U^A;« 
Table II shows the path to the crisis of 1878. The pr.ce of exports reached it 
second highest level for the period in 1872 and although falhng. the level for the 
nexttwoyearswasabovetheaverageofthepre 187 penod Frojnt^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
prices began a sharp decline, reaching their lowest level - ^^^^/^J^^^^'/^P^^^^^ 
declined and, as indicated in Table III, the trade balance began to « h o ^ deficu^ 
The external shock was compounded by a domest.c shock: - - " 8 ; ^ ^ad harve s 
in 1875 1876 and 1877 provoked an increase in the domest.c pnce level and a re-
duction'ofmorethanfor.percentonwh.^^^^^^^^^^ 
exchange rate appreciated by more than th.rty percen n-om 
fore the level of imports rose, ^ ^^f^:^::^^, thus reducing 
The - ™ \ f ^ ^ ^ - 7 - t ^ ^ ^ ¿^^^^^^^^ predicts that banks 
banks' specie hold.ngs. The P " " ; ? " ; ' ^ ^able I Chilean banks reduced the 
should reduce the money supply, as shown .n 1 awe 1, ^n 
• T uu TTT indicares that as the external .mbalance loomea, 
spec.e reserve rat.o. Table 111 .ndicates tnai a „ , , „„tnmiiúc adiust-
™„ey -notes plus ^ J » ' - ' " ^ ° 1 „ , ,.', (TMe I). By n,,d 1878 ru™o„ 
wh,le sp.™ reserves =''l^™>» ' ¿ ™ ,^ ,^^  „ „ „ , f ¡ ,U Ae h.lls of Santiago and 
;Z:^ttEtKfn^ .^^ :ullb 
, j j • Tokip n is a Droxv for variations in the price of non-
^ The domestic price Índex included m l^^l^J „ansportation costs allowed for a large 
traded goods. Although wheat was a traded ^ ° " " ° ' ' ' ^ ' i J^i , , „f ^heat rose by more than 30 
spread between FOB and CIF prices; in those years, domestic p 
percent without inducing a flow of imports. 
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banks and in June 1878 there was a run on the country's largest bank. Banks' reser-
ves were equal to only 7.58 percent of outstanding notes plus deposits and forty-
one percent of outstanding notes: they could not face a financial panic. 
TABLE II 
Exchange Rate and Export Pnces: Chile 1860-1878 
(índices based ¿n 1870. Annual averages) 
Year 
1860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 
1866 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872... , 
1873. . . . 
1874.. . . 
1875.. . . 
1876.. . . 
1877.. . . 
1878 
Nominal 
Exchange 
Rate 
$/l 
5.49 
5.42 
5.28 
5.47 
5.42 
5.24 
5.15 
5.13 
5.21 
5.21 
5.26 
5.22 
5.18 
5.36 
5.38 
5.48 
5.92 
5.71 
6.06 
Domestic 
Price 
Index 
(1) 
n.a. 
91.04 
96.68 
93.63 
81.78 
71.97 
71.95 
92.71 
106.56 
92.57 
100.00 
102.90 
111.51 
109.68 
109.57 
123.59 
122.62 
137.21 
143.66 
Export 
Price 
Index 
(2) 
134.1 
131.3 
130.5 
127.7 
124.9 
120.8 
122.4 
119.9 
121.3 
103.1 
100.0 
119.3 
133.2 
129.4 
125.1 
115.8 
107.1 
106.2 
88.3 
Sauerheck 
Price 
Index 
103.13 
102.08 
105.21 
107.29 
109.38 
105.21 
106.25 
104.17 
103.13 
102.08 
100.00 
104.17 
113.54 
115.63 
106.25 
100.00 
98.96 
97.92 
90.63 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
(3) 
n.a. 
115.45 
109.27 
119.16 
137.71 
145.58 
144.70 
109.51 
95.86 
109.23 
100.00 
100.54 
100.17 
107.32 
99.14 
84.25 
90.76 
77.39 
72.62 
Exports 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate (4) 
n.a. 
148.61 
135.49 
141.83 
157.37 
167.21 
166.56 
126.13 
112.75 
110.32 
100.00 
115.06 
117.63 
120.22 
116.78 
97.62 
98.30 
84.02 
70.81 
NOTES: 
(1) Domestic price index tries to capture non-traded prices, it includes six producís: bran, beans, 
wheat, corn, flour and one cow. 
(2) Exports price index is a Paasche index that includes three commodities: copper, silver and 
wheat whose share on Chilean exports was above 75 %, prices are those observed in London. 
(3) Real exchange rate = (Nominal exchange rate/Domestic price index) *Sauerbeck price index. 
(4) Exports real exchange rate = (Nominal exchange rate/Domestic price index) *Exports price 
index. 
SouRCES: (1) Domestic Prices: bran, beans, wheat and corn, from J. M. Mamalakis, Historical Statistics 
of Chile, Vol. 3 pp. 215-219; flour and cow from A. Bauer, Chilean Rural Society, p. 234. (2) 
Export Prices: Oficina Central de Estadísticas, Sinopsis Geográfica y Estadística, 1925, p. 116. 
(3) Nominal Exchange Rate: Sinopsis Geográfica y Estadística, several issues. 
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TABLE III 
Extemal Imhalance and Change ofthe Money Supply 
(Thousand of Pesos) 
Year 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
Balance 
(1) 
- 2,215 
5,209 
3,522 
- 534 
- 3,370 
- 6,647 
- 4,672 
- 2,952 
- 293 
Current 
Account 
(2) 
- 4,598 
2,837 
1,148 
- 3,229 
- 6,626 
- 10,184 
- 9,066 
- 7,171 
- 4,745 
Net 
Specie 
Trade 
0) 
- 967 
- 141 
1,057 
- 874 
- 1,451 
- 3,404 
- 3,368 
710 
- 3,352 
Change 
of Money 
Supply 
(4), 0) 
1,181 
10,068 
20,009 
- 5,835 
- 276 
815 
1,033 
- 5,449 
(1) Trade balance does not include specie «ade of Bovernment's extemal debt. 
(2) Current account equals the trade balance ™ ^ "^"<=^ 8 ° ^ " " ' " 
(3) Difference between imports ^"j^^.^r^^^^^^eT„'the stock of coins plus the change in the 
(4) Change in the nioney .^"PP'^ ^ ' ' ' ^ r * t n 3 balance of specie trade plus coinage by 
stock of bank money. Change in the stock «^coms equais tne D 
the Mint, bank money equals outstandmg b.*f^"°'f, ^ ^ ^ , / / f o , 1372, therefore the change ofthe 
(5) We did not have access to cominerc.al banks balances to 
motley supply for 1873 was calculated for the years 1871 and 1873. 
SOURCE: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, 1860-1925. 
r^ TI 1 qr i 8781 don Melchor Concha y Toro, representing the Boardof 
«On July 19 [jS^S], don Me en .^^^^ p.^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ 
Directors of the Banco Nacional ^e C h ü e - ^ o ^^ ^ 
situation of the bank. In a few days its metalic ^ " ^ f j ^ " " P^ j^ ^^e auth-
pesos» 3. Faced with the failure ofthe country's ^-'^^^'.'"J^to^s 
L i e s decreed a . o r a t o H u . - ^ ^ ^ l - X S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Traditionally, it has been argued '^l'^'f'^^^^^^ banks of issue, when a 
maior mistake 1 However, w.th.n a ^y^r'^^^^^Zoíthc rest ofthe banks 
maior bank faces a run the - - ^ ^ f j i n g a L o n the financial system. In this 
only tends to make matters worse becormng a ru ^^ ^^ ^^  ^ ^^ .^ 
case the authorities acted as a ^ i e^ocen ral bank and 
so doing they prevented even greater evils. 
3 Encina (1950), vol. XVI, p. 79^ ^^^^„„ ,1982), Pinto (1959), Vial (1981). 
" Encina (191 l),Espinoza (1909), fe t teru7^ 
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3. YEARS OF THE PAPER PESO: 1880-1894 
The authorities considered inconvertibility transitory: it was to last only until 
banks were able to increase their metallic reserves. Accordingly, the government 
did not issue a single note. The traumatic events of June 1878 prompted the gov-
ernment to reform the Banking Law of 1860 by introducing a guarantee require-
ment for outstanding bank notes as well as for new issues. This backing was equal 
to twenty-five per cent of total issue and was to be met by deposits of mortgage 
bonds, government bonds or buUion with the Treasury. This regulation implicitly 
established a market regulated mechanism for creating high powered money: 
whenever banks wanted to increase their note issue by one peso, they had to de-
posit mortgage bonds worth twenty-five cents at the Treasury. This mechanism 
does not differ from contemporary open market operations carried out by central 
banks to control the money supply, except that here there was no central bank. 
The outcome of this rule under a system of competing banks of issue is to peg the 
nominal interest rate, with the money supply accommodating to changes in the 
money demand. Given these conditions, the interest rate is the best indicator of 
the direction of monetary policy: rising interest rates are sign of contractionary 
policy, while falling rates suggest expansionary policy; stable interest rates point 
toward accommodating the money supply to changes in the demand for real cash 
balances. Given that Chile is a small country, she did not have control over the in-
ternational interest rate; therefore, the acid test for monetary policy is the evol-
ution of the interest rate differential —spread— between domestic and foreign 
rates'. 
The new regime did not have enough time work before a new shock: by Fe-
bruary 1879 winds of war crossed the country and on April 1879, Chile declared 
war to Perú and Bolivia. The already difficult fiscal situation became more acute. 
Being unable to secute a new loan from the banks, for the first time in history, the 
government issued legal tender notes. There were three issues: the finst in 1879 for 
twelve million pesos, the second in 1880 for fourteen million pesos and the third 
in 1880 for two million pesos. 
The rapid increase of the monetary base and of the money stock in 1879 and 
' From 1840 to 1928 Chile had easy access to international capital markets: she raised large 
amount of funds at relatively lew cost. The return on Chilean government bonds denominated in con-
vertible currencies —French francs, Germán marks and British pounds— was lower than the return 
on Italian government bonds denominated in convertible currencies. Return on Chilean bonds fol-
lowed the London rates without a clear indication of the market up- or downgrading the country's 
risk. The spread between the domestic interest rate and the return on Chilean bonds denominated in 
convertible currencies is the proper test for monetary policy, however, continuous data on the return 
of those bonds is not available at the moment. 
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1880 resulted in a reduction of the domestic interest rate and of the spread _ n 
fact during the war - 1 8 7 9 to 1 8 8 3 - the interest rate and the spread fell wh le 
the nominal exchange rate fluctuated around $ 6.50 per pound and domestic 
prices stabilized. The new monetary regime proved to be quite stable m face of a 
war, not a small feat. In 1884 there was a severe extemal «^ock the price of ni-
.a te , n o . the country's most - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ X ^ ^ ^ - -
percent with respect to the previous three year average. ne leve 
tivity dropped and so did the demand for money. but as shown in Table IV, do-
m e s ! interest rate and the spread varied very litt e, a sign «f the - tomat ic c 
commodation of the money supply to changes in the 7 ^ ^ f ^^ ^^ f^/^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
the price of this kind of stabiHty was nominal and real exchange rate deprecia 
ion however, the change in relative prices shifted production to - d e d goods 
nd consumpdon to non-traded goods. helping to cióse the externa ,p. I n n-
terestin. to note that the crisis of 1884/85 was more severe than that of 1877/78. 
^ d f country been under the gold standard in ^^^^/']^<^^-^^l-^:, 
formed Banking Law, the extemal crisis would have generated the same kind of 
financial disruption as in 1878. • .:„„„f.u»pvrhaneerate 
Although the new regime proved its worth, f J P ^ ^ ^ °^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^ 
dominated policy makers considerations from 1880 to 'f^J^^^^^^^^^^^ 
problem was a difficult one: a trade off between financial ^^^^^^ll^^^^ 
Lty. . .eauthori t iesthphtthecau.^^^^^^^^^^ 
fiscal notes. Consequently, they tried to reduce tne circu 
ing to appreciate the peso. The first conversión law, passed m March 1887, came 
about as a result of these id^as^ installments of $ 
The law required ^^e 8 ° ^ ^ ™ " ° " " ^ ' J ^ ^ circulation of fiscal notes had 
100,000 in fiscal notes, this was to be ¿-^l^^^^^' ^^e government had to 
been reduced to eigh.en - ' " - " ^ f^^ ^^  jj^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
hoard silver for the redemption of the outstanding n j j jl ^^ 
the backing for bank notes to fifty percent, however, this guarantee 
met with mortgage b^nds^ ^^ ^ ^^ j ^ ^ To prompt currency 
Hie authonties dully ^^^^^^'^^^^^^ of fiscal notes at the Treasury. 
appreciation they also began to '^''^1^'^° ,^^^^ ^iped out by the banks. 
These contractionary measures were almost completeiy w p 
, • , J mnní-v as «the set of assets that constrains the 
^ Balbach and Burger (1976) define high P"'^^'^^'^"^^^^^ ^hich the Consolidated banking sec-
growth of the money stock», and identib' these ass ^^^^ li^bilities which are used as money». 
tor uses to settle interbank debt and those, asme ^^ ^^^ ^ ^^^^^ ^¡ outstanding fiscal 
Using these concepts, starting 1878 '^e/"onetary b a s e j eq ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ j^ .^ j^ ^^^ 
notes in the hands of the public and the banks, plus twenty 
the backing in mortgage bonds. 
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Table V shows that while the government tried to reduce fiscal notes, the banks in-
crease the amount of bank notes in circulation. Contrary to policy makers expecta-
tions, the exchange rate did not appreciate: it remained at a level of $ 9.55 per 
pound (see Table IV). 
TABLE IV 
Monetary Policy Indicators: 1878-1894 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances Decemher 31) 
Year 
1878 ... 
1879 ... 
1880 ... 
1881 ... 
1882 ... 
1883 ... 
1884 ... 
1885 ... 
1886 ... 
1887 ... 
1888 ... 
1889 ... 
1890 ,,, 
1891 ... 
1892 ... 
1893 ... 
1894 
Outstanding Notes 
Fiscal 
(1) 
0 
.. 12,000 
.. 19,090 
.. 26,325 
.. 16,810 
.. 16,692 
.. 16,500 
., 16,622 
.. 17,072 
.. 16,472 
.. 18,400 
.. 19,900 
,. 20,884 
.. 41,693 
.. 30,764 
.. 38,361 
38,361 
Bank 
9,466 
12,871 
11,795 
9,740 
9,556 
10,065 
10,595 
11,653 
12,280 
12,224 
14,312 
17,629 
19,832 
14,302 
15,815 
19,439 
19,146 
High 
Powered 
Money 
(2) 
11,833 
15,217 
22,093 
28,760 
19,199 
19,208 
19,148 
19,535 
20,142 
22,584 
25,556 
28,714 
30,799 
51,359 
38,671 
42,248 
42,190 
Nominal 
Money 
Stock 
0) 
40,296 
51,011 
79,217 
83,516 
71,136 
72,836 
77,598 
76,546 
78,861 
86,735 
108,307 
118,693 
118,581 
151,134 
165,205 
158,541 
161,344 
Domestic 
Interest 
Rate 
10.23 
8.93 
6.80 
6.18 
6.13 
6.35 
6.30 
6.41 
6.48 
6.22 
6.13 
6.24 
6.53 
n.a. 
6.43 
6.96 
7.66 
Spread 
(4) 
7.08 
5.85 
3.75 
3.18 
3.14 
3.38 
3.33 
3.39 
3.50 
3.27 
3,16 
3.43 
3.86 
n.a. 
3.78 
4.35 
5.14 
Exchange 
Rate 
$/£ 
m 
6.06 
7.27 
7.73 
7.75 
6.78 
7.44 
7,56 
9.43 
10.03 
9.80 
9.14 
9.04 
9.97 
12.76 
12.76 
16.00 
19.11 
Domestic 
Price 
Index 
(6) 
143.66 
97,07 
100,60 
108,76 
103,56 
113.68 
147.56 
132.43 
126.47 
140.81 
152.77 
165,34 
159.63 
159.44 
170.04 
183.57 
184.62 
NOTES: 
(1) Outstanding Fiscal Notes are equal to Outstanding Registered Fiscal notes minus deposits of 
fiscal notes at the Treasury. 
(2) High Powered Money or monetary base =• Outstanding Fiscal Notes + mortgage bonds de-
posited at the Treasury equal to 25 percent of Bank Notes until 1886 and to 50 percent from there on 
(3) Money Stock - Outstanding Fiscal Notes + Bank Notes - Bank Reserves in the form of Cur-
rency + Deposits. 
(4) Measures the difference between yield of Chilean mortgage bonds and British consols. 
(5) Annual average. 
(6) Same as in Table II with 1870 equal to 100. 
SouRCES: Monetary and interest rate series: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, Appendix C- exchange 
rate series: E. Molina, Bosquejo Histórico de la Hacienda Pública de Chile desde la Independencia 
hasta la Fecha, p. 19. 
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TABLE V 
Fiscal and Bank Notes Counterpoint, 1886-1890 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances Decemher 31) 
Year 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
Outstanding 
26,088 
24,888 
23,688 
22,488 
20,884 
Fiscal Notes 
Deposits 
at Treasury 
9,015 
8,415 
5,288 
2,488 
0 
Actual 
Circulation 
\lfil2 
16,472 
18,400 
19,900 
20,884 
Bank Notes 
Actual 
Circulation 
12,280 
12,224 
14,312 
17,629 
19,832 
SOURCE: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, p. 179. 
On January 1891, a mounting institutional conflict between the President and 
Congress led to a Civil War. From a monetary standpoint, the eífect of the war was 
an explosión of the monetary base: it rose by more than sixty percent while the 
money supply rose by twenty-seven percent. The exchange - t e depreaated 
accordingly: it dropped from an average of $ 9.55 per pound from 1885 to 1890 to $ 
12.76 in 1891. . , , 
The new administration inaugurated in October 1891 retired more than ten 
million pesos from circulation during 1892 and passed a second conversión law. 
The law's main provisions were (1) the establishment of a new currency umt: the 
peso of twenty-four pence, i.e., ten pesos per pound, (2) the mcmeration of one 
third of outstanding registered fiscal notes, (3) the return to convertib.hty by De-
cember 1895: on that date fiscal notes were to be redeemed m «>lver peso co,n of 
twenty-five grams or a new gold coin worth twenty-four pence, and (4) the e a 
bUshment o?a bullion reserve requirement of twenty percent on bank note. sue. 
The combined effect of these two measures provoke a senous monetary co^rac-
tion during the first quarter of 1893. The government response ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J i 
milhon pesos and to pass a third conversión law that postponed resumption until 
June 1896 but kept all the other provisions of the previous law 
Thecombinedeffectofthesetwoconversionlawswasadechnemthestocko 
credtdeposús and themoneysupply.Banksmetthebulhonreserve requirement 
r ^ , . ,• • , „A of inrreasine their net worth, which were the au-
by liquidatmg credit instead of mcreasing mcu „, ;„ i «OÍ ^„A I 004 
L • . • M^„,in<.l and real money stock were lowerm 1893 and 1894 
thorities' expectations. Nommal ano reai munt)' ^„r^-, j ís^e 1 .u A^rr^^^tir interest rate rose as did tne spreaa isee than in 1892, consequendy the domestic interesi ra i 35 
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Table IV). All these added to the resumption at a higher rate than the market 
exchange rate should have produced currency appreciation, but on the contrary, 
there was currency depreciation: the peso fell by fifty percent from 1892 to 1893, it 
recovered by a mere nine percent in 1894. A game theoretical explanation suggests 
that the government's threat of returning to convertibility on a fu ture date —three 
years ahead— with a distorted parity between silver and gold and at a higher than 
the market exchange rate was not credible, the public worried by the issue of 
Treasury Notes in 1893 tried to hedge against a depreciation —instead of appreci-
ation— thus effectively depreciated the exchange rate. 
There is an additional hypothesis for the depreciation. The price of silver fell 
by almost forty percent from 1892 to 1894. The price of silver is crucial because 
the government did not say in which metal resumption was going to take place, the 
public, perhaps correctly, assumed that it was going to happen in silver, the lesser 
expensive alterative for the government, therefore the peso had to fall with silver. 
4. PARADISE RECOVERED: GOLD STANDARD 
IN ACTION, 1895-1898 
In February 1895, after three years in office and a great deal of maneuvering, 
President Montt put together a coalition with enough support in Congress to pass 
a definitive conversión law. It set a new parity of 13.33 pesos per pound or eigh-
teen pence per peso as of June 1,1895, date in which the government was to begin 
redeeming the outstanding fiscal notes. The law required banks to fully back their 
notes with bullion deposited at the Mint, however, until 1897 banks could fulfill 
this requirement by depositing fiscal notes, government bonds, mortgage bonds or 
municipal bonds. The law also set a limit to the amount of total bank notes at 
twenty-four million pesos, effectively rescinding the banks' right to issue notes be-
cause by the time the amount of outstanding bank notes was 21.4 million pesos. 
Congress authorized the President to sell nitrate fields for financing the operation 
This conversión scheme altered the monetary system in fundamental ways. 
The retirement of fiscal notes made it similar to the pre —1878 system, the main differ-
ence being the 100 percent bullion backing for bank notes and the fact that the 
amount of bank notes in circulation was fixed. The creation of high powered 
money was under neither government or bank control; it depended, as in the pre— 
1878 period, on the economy's external balance. Also it should be noted that this 
time the authorities explicitly introduced a mono-metallic standard based in gold. 
Simply passing a law does not solve the complexities of returning to converti-
bility. The government had enough gold to redeem its own notes, but commercial 
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banks did not. Table VI shows commercial banks balance sheet at December 
1894 According to those figures the ratio of specie to outstanding notes was 0.40 
and that of specie to notes plus deposits was 0.05; in other words, if notes and 
deposits were transformed into gold coins, banks would have gone bankrupt. 
TABLE VI 
Commercial Banks Balance Sheet: December 1894 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos) 
Assets 
Liahilíties 
r u , ,• 7 485 Outstanding Bank Notes 19,146 
Specie Holdings '>^°-' " 190871 
FiscalNotes 26,036 Deposits^ 1^9,8^ 
Loans 1H267 Net Worth 51,331 
Other Net Assets 12,562 
Total 200,350 
200,350 
SOURCE: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, Appendix C. 
Aware of these circumstances, the authorities passed an additional law in May 
1895 establishing that the Treasury would fully redeem secured bank notes m 
gold coins as ,f they were fiscal notes I Banks would recover their notes by gmng 
To the government their gold valué. They also could give letters of credit with a 6.1 
interest rate and a monthly three percent sinking fiínd; m th.s c a - "o^s wou d 
not be returned to the banks. The law also limited the amount of bank notes to 
those already registered with the Mint. ,L„ „„„^ . , „ , 
The conversión scheme had several problems, some related to the monetary 
system, others to the fi^nctioning of the economy In terms of the - n e t a ^ . ys em 
• uV i, j • .;..„l«tinnandefrectivelyeiminatedfiduciarycurrencyatter 
itestab ished specie circulation ana ciic«,uvi.;- . . ,. . 
1897. A monetary system with this characteristics curtails financ.al ^ -^-^f^^^ 
by commercial banks. The law was bound to genérate a ^ --^^'''^^ ^^"^^^^^^ 
stock. However, once the short-term impact of the conversión - J - ^ ' ^ ^ - w 
law did not solve the perennial problem °f ^ ^ ' 1 - banking le^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
overexpansion. There was no provisión requinng banks to hold any reserve over 
( ,r. fhnse banks that had deposited with the Treasury 
. Fully secured bank notes were note^ r^^ ^^^^^^^^^ 
specie and/or government bonds, fiscal notes, municipd 
issues. 
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deposits. In other words, this conversión strategy was a return to square one, to the 
pre-1878 situation, the only difference being that banks were not able to issue 
notes, so that external shocks would be transmitted faster to the domestic 
economy. 
The short-term impact of the monetary contraction was amplified bccause the 
exchange rate fixed for conversión was not the current rate: the average rate in 
1893 was sixteen pesos per pound, in 1894,19.5 pesos, in January 1895,16.9 pesos 
and in February 1895, 15.1 pesos. From there on the exchange rate appreciated 
fast to reach 13.56 pesos in June. Business conditions, which were already weak 
due to the world crisis, further deteriorated due to appreciation. Subercaseaux de-
scribed a grim situation: «Of the nine existing banks [...] seven were constituted as 
incorpórate companies; and of these four were compelled to cióse their doors.» 
Later, «Interest rates undenvent an extraordinary increase, while the quotation of 
mortgage bonds and other securities suffered a pronounced decline, as did the 
valué of rural and urban properties. All this, moreover, was accompanied by an 
extraordinary paralysation of business and general restriction of credit.» * Fetter 
concentrated on the severity of the external shock: Chilean prices were low in gold 
terms and there were poor grain harvests in 1894, 1895 and 1897. «The serious 
economic situation is shown in the decline in the operations of the banks, the rise 
in interest rates, and the abrupt increase in the payments in arrears to the Caja de 
Crédito Hipotecario» .^ Valdes Vergara wrote that the 1895 conversión caused «... 
slow and painful sacrifices that were the cause of many misfortunes; desolating 
many households who had ruinously liquídate solid business fortunes and 
prosperous business. [These sacrifices] enriched some with the deprivation of 
others producing new elements of social discord and unrest.» "^  
As shown in Table VII, there was a severe depression in banking activity: de-
posits fell by more than forty percent while credit operations fell by twenty 
percent from June to December of 1895. This extraordinary shrinkage is the result 
of two combined and reinforcing causes: the public tried to reduce its holdings of 
deposits to obtain gold coins, and at the same time banks were forced to build up 
bullion reserves equal to 100 percent of their issues. The only way out was an 
absolute reduction in the stock of credit. 
Table VIII shows the movements of the money supply components during 
this period. Besides the banking depression, the virtual elimination of fiscal notes 
provoked a fall of more than twenty percent in the nominal money stock. This 
Subercaseaux (1922), p. 115. 
Fetter(1931), p lOl . 
» Valdes Vergara (1913), p. U, 
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figure was probably higher because the public was inclined to hoard gold coms 
instead of using them; at least this is what contemporary economists observed. In 
fact the ratio of currency in hands of the public to deposits rose from twenty per-
cent in June 1895 to 48.7 percent in June 1898. But this was a rational attitude: 
given bad business conditions, banks solvency problems and an extremely deh-
cate situation with Argentina, expectations of returning to inconvertibihty were 
high; and with inconvertibility there was the possibility of reahzmg a new capital 
gain by sticking to one's coins. 
TABLE VII 
Banking Activity Indicators: 1894-1898 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos) 
Specie 
Year Holdings ¿"""^ 
1894 2 7,485 154,267 
1895.1 11,319 145,830 
1895.2 14,199 148,107 
1896.1 12,843 127,163 
1896.2 16,338 135,958 
1897.1 13,524 "-a-
1897.2 14,592 133,919 
1898.1 13,300 "-a-
1898.2 9,505 146,435 
Deposits 
129,873 
131,572 
122,266 
98,885 
103,078 
96,500 
100,572 
91,000 
128,976 
Bank Notes 
19,146 
21,334 
19,841 
19,937 
18,856 
19,328 
14,862 
10,900 
0 
SOURCE: A. Liona, Chtlean Monetary Poltcy, Appendix C, p. 309, Table 79. 
The impact of the monetary restriction on domestic interest rate and the 
ine impací ui u ^ figures do not contradict 
spread was severe, as shown in ^ .^e VIH J h o s ^ g ^^ .^,^ ^^ 
contemporary economists appreaation of the severa ^^  ^^^^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ 
CajadeCredito Hipotecar, bon^s-o^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
1878, and the spread between this rate ana mo 
centage points ^^^ ^ ^ ^ y have ex-
Given the h.gh ^ ap^tal mobilit^ obse ved y ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  ^^ ^^ ^ ^^^^^ 
pected gold inflows to 'f^'^'''''Z^[^lXy but they never took place, 
ineows would have eased the ^ ^^^^l^^^^^^^, . . ^ ^ h by mid 1897. 
The depress.on provoked by ^^e conve ^ ed with ninety-six 
In July 1897 bank deposits were only forty million pesos comp 
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the previous month and, although there was appreciation of the exchange rate, 
imports fell by thirteen percent. Table VI shows that the interest rate remained at 
an extremely high level for an economy under the gold standard. The interest rate 
differential did not induce capital inflows, on the contrary, from 1895 to 1897 
there was an outflow of gold coins. 
TABLE VIII 
Monetary Aggregates: 1894-1898 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos) 
Year 
1894.2 
1895.1 
1895.2 
1896.1 
1896.2 
1897.1 
1897.2 
1898.1 
1898.2 
Currency 
38,361 
36,675 
22,859 
32,326 
37,362 
39,530 
39,772 
44,300 
19,022 
High 
Powered 
Money (1) 
42,190 
39,772 
35,403 
42,650 
49,600 
48,200 
47,400 
51,700 
41,173 
Nominal 
Money 
Stock 
161,344 
165,247 
137,220 
131,211 
137,780 
136,030 
135,972 
135,300 
147,998 
Domestic 
Interest 
Rate 
n.a. 
8.84 
n.a. 
9.75 
n.a. 
9.02 
n.a. 
8.95 
n.a. 
Spread 
n.a. 
6.45 
n.a. 
7.47 
n.a. 
6.77 
n.a. 
6.67 
n.a. 
Exchange 
Rate 
$/£ 
17.30 
13.57 
13.76 
13.81 
13.71 
13.71 
13.61 
13.91 
18.82 
NOTE: 
(1) The monetary base is equal to banks' reserves plus the amount of coins in the hands of the 
non-banking public. Note that bank reserves can only be specie or gold coins and that it is possible to 
calcúlate the stock of coins in the system because the amount of notes redeemed is known and so is 
specie trade. 
SOURCE; A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, Appendix C. 
By the end of 1897 and beginning of 1898 the crisis was slowly passing. 
However, a long standing border dispute with Argentina became quite acute. 
Congress held long secret sessions during May and June of 1898 debating the 
possibility of war and the government raised defense expenditure and negotiated 
the purchase of two new batdeships. 
The shaky situation of the remaining banks, added to rumors of an imminent 
return to inconvertibility due to the coming war, provoked a run on the banks of 
Santiago and Valparaíso. Fetter reported «... on Tuesday, July 5 [1898], a heavy run 
started on the Santiago office of the Banco de Chile, by far the most important 
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bank in the country. The run continued on July 6 with even greater seventy, 
although it did not spread to other banks or cides in Chi e A panic existed which, 
if left unchecked, would have certainly resulted in the failure of the bank.» 
In view of these circumstances the authorities ordered the banks o cbse 
their doors for four days. Congress, meeting in secret sess.on on July 11 1898, 
passed a moratorium forbidding any executive action leading to foreclosures 
L thirty days. On July 31, 1898, Congress passed a bill restoring inconver-
ibil ty. The law authorLed the government to issue fifty milhon pesos of lega 
tender notes, inclusive of the existing bank notes, the existing bank notes were 
dedaredfiscl.Themostimportantprovisionoftheawwastorescmdcommer-
da banks- right to issue notes. The bill also estabUshed that the government 
cotld use as'much of the new issue as needed to ^0^^^^^^^^;^^^^^^^ 
crunch. By July 6, 1898, outstanding bank notes carne to 19,056,548 pesos and 
by the end of the month they had received hrom the government 21.666,541 
pesos - T h L c t i o n added to inconvertibility, stopped the run on the banks 
S reeslblished public confidence in the banks. ^^^¡¡lli;^^^^^ 
depreciation: the peso fell from $ 13.91 per pound m June to $ 18.28 in September 
and $ 18.82 in December ^ f 8. government could not dilute 
After thirty-seven months «^ ^ T ; '^ ^ ¿ t 
thepublic'sexpectationofanev ^al^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^.^^ ^ ^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^p,,l 
high interestrate and spread for thspn^^^ circumstances converge to 
inflows constitute proof of this ^''"''^ . .^^ the law had four serious transform expectations into realizationsJn he firs^^^^^^^^^^ 
technicalmistakes:(l).tsettheparrat $ 3^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
was$ 19.10,i.e.,itimpl.adycarried pnced^^^^^^^^^ J P ^ ^ . ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^^^^^^ 
full bullion backing for bank notes ^ut " j l ^ J ° ^ \ „ j ^^^¿i, (3, ¡, established 
ratio for deposits, thus permitting ^^f^^^^^'^^d to be paid in co in s -
specie circulation - t axes - f J - ^ ^ ; ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
which aggravated the crisis of July 1898 and (4) ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ 
or, at least, acurrency board that ^oM^^l^cyísasevereexternal shock: the 
second place, the economy faced duri^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
could be maintained. 
V;:;:;;..n,, .or m . . ^ ^ ^ ^ -««e^ .y s u b e ™ . 192. . n . 
^2 Santelices (1900), pp. CLXXIV-CLXXV. 
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5. 1898-1908: FROM ABSTINENCE TO INDULGENCE 
The new monetary arrangements, by rescinding the banks' right to issue notes, 
made the Treasury the solé institution empowered to issue fiduciary money. 
Inconvertibility severed the link between balance of payments and monetary base. 
Although this feature may be welcome, the new arrangements did not provide a 
mechanism for supplying high powered money. Subercaseaux stated that «The 
new monetary system, reduced as it was to a fixed circulation of Treasury notes, 
was absolutely inelastic.» '^  The monetary base became solely the stock of fiscal 
notes in circulation, and its change the result of discretionary policy. 
This monetary system was among the weakest in Chilean history; money supply 
was left to fluctuate due to changes of the deposits multiplier, i.e., banks' reserve 
ratio, which, in turn, is the outcome of the banks' portfolio management. By then, 
the government had saved the banks in July 1878, May 1893 and July 1898; therefore, 
the profit function of the banks incorporated the already fulfilled expectation 
of the government acting as lender of last resort. Consequently, the deposit reserve 
ratio was lower than the one implicit in the banking law; which established un-
limited liability. Therefore, the authorities' aim to limit credit overexpansion by res-
cinding the banks' right to issue notes backfired in an ominous way: banks expanded 
by reducing the reserve ratio, thus increasing the likelihood of insolvency. 
The economy accommodated rapidly to the new regime. By mid- 1899 the 
exchange rate had appreciated to $ 15.48 per pound. The domestic interest rate 
declined from 8.95 percent in 1898 to 7.87 percent in 1900, the spread declined from 
6.67 in 1898 to 6.04 in 1899 and 5.33 in 1900. General business conditions 
improved while commercial banks fully recovered and expanded rapidly. Table IX 
shows the tremendous expansión of loans and deposits from 1898 to 1904. However, 
the same Table depicts that this expansión was on weak foundations: commercial 
banks not only reduced their reserve ratio, but the absolute level of reserves 
dwindled from 1898 to 1904. 
Falling domestic interest rate and spread plus improvement of Chilean export 
prices had positive effects on the domestic economy, particularly investment 
expenditure. The economy experienced a stock market boom accompanied by an 
outburst of financial speculation, especially after 1904. Capital incorporated into 
new joint stock companies rose from an annual average of 18.6 million gold pesos 
from 1900 to 1903 to 66.6 in 1904, 174.92 in 1905 and 172.7 in 1906 i" ''. 
" Subercaseaux(1922), p. 117. 
'•< See for example Castedo (1982), pp. 351-352 and Fetter (1931), pp. 120-121. 
" Gold peso is the monetary unit created by the Conversión Law of 1895, its worth is 18 pence, 
or 13.33 gold pesos per pound. 
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TABLE IX 
Commercial Banking Expansión: 1898-1908 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances December 31) 
Year Reserves 
Deposit-
Loans Deposits Reserve Ratio 
,«i-5inn 146 435.00 128,976.00 0.22 
'^ : ^^ , = "i 
14^6:56 162,860.50 127,669.00 1902 16.5^^'^ : • • • : : , „ , , o o o o.n 
1652274 174,997.88 131,253.31 
=::::: EE Eí Si :;: 
1905 33,542.78 ^^1' . _ . ,,Aín481 0,13 6 4o,«.°-.' : ;r548 8i 379,497.13 o.u
-«^ TJ!-^ : : ; 387:242.81 
1908 64,903.42 472,072.50 
°7í) This year does not include foreign banks. 
SOURCE: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, Appendix C. 
second semester of 1904 and they --P^^^^^j^^T^^^^^^^^^^ L only 
In December 1904, banks'reserves - " J ^^^^^J^^J^g^e.nrnent to issue thirty 
10.9 percent. After some debate [^f;^^^^¡''^^^^^ he government as general 
rnillion pesos in fiscal notes, ofwhich en mimonw^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  g ^ ^ ^ ^^^ ^^.^ ^^ 
revenue and twenty milhon were used to buy """"'^f „ ^^^^j^^^^^.o 
Crédito Hipotecario.Thisoperationwasperforme^d^^^^^^^^^^^ 
Octoberl905.Nowtherewasplentyo^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
in 1905 the monetary ^''''''\^\l^^J^^^^^^^ n^oney increase that became 
71.2 percent. Money ra.n i.e., the ^ ^^^^^^^'^'J^^ ¿ s e thus the price level 
fiscal revenue, represented " X X ^ h o t S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ the case, 
should have risen by that much. TaWe X stow ^^ . ^ ^  ^^^.^^ 
The open market operation '^°'"P°"^"; f/J^hTdomeTtic interest rate, and 
mortgage bonds, produced the - f ^ . ^ j ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
curiouslyenough the spreadalsofell-Under norma ^^ 
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TABLE X 
Monetary Policy Indicators: 1899-1908 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances December 31) 
High Nominal Domestic Non-traded Exchange 
powered money interest price rate 
Year money stock rate Spread índex (1) $/C 
1899 50,797 
1900 50,746 
1901 50,769 
1902 50,395 
1903 50,467 
1904 54,983 
1905 80,611 
1906 120,412 
1907 150,536 
1908 150,222 
139,433 
149,299 
n. a. 
165,126 
164,009 
194,904 
333,670 
429,880 
479,962 
472,561 
8,95 
8.40 
7.87 
7.63 
7.24 
6.94 
6.57 
6.75 
7,14 
7.41 
6.04 
5.33 
5.01 
4.73 
4.49 
4.11 
3.80 
3.92 
4.17 
4.51 
47.33 
49.26 
52.06 
46.30 
48.47 
49.00 
57.88 
77.30 
85.26 
90.26 
16.55 
14.29 
15.12 
15.80 
14.44 
14.65 
15.36 
16.69 
19.84 
24.94 
NOTE: 
(1) This price index intends to capture non-traded goods price level, from 1899 until 1908 it in-
eludes, with equal weights, twelve agricultural commodities; from 1908 until 1925 the index is a weighted 
average between the previous one and a wholesale price index for manufactures; the weights are given by 
the relative importance in production of the two sectors. The index base is 1913 equal to 100. 
SoURCES: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, for monetary data; M. Ballesteros and T. Davis, «El Creci-
miento de la Producción y del Empleo en Sectores Básicos de la Economía Chilena», for prices 
of manufactures and Sinopsis Geográfica y Estadística, several issues, for agricultural prices. 
Under these favorable conditions, bank credit further expanded and specula-
tion in the stock market continued unabated. Bank reserves, however, started to 
dwindle again early in 1906. In March 1906, Subercaseaux set reserves at 22.2 
million pesos '6. Assuming deposits did not change from December 1905 to March 
1906, the reserve ratio would have been only 7.8 percent. By April 1906 there were 
rumors about the banks' lack of liquidity, these rumors affected, in particular, the 
biggest commercial bank ". But as in other occasions, Congress was ready to help 
and on May 1906 it authorized the issue of forty million pesos in fiscal notes. Of 
these, twenty million became government revenue and twenty million could be 
taken by credit institutions or privare citizens against gold deposits of eighteen 
pence per peso. In case these funds were not taken by the public, they could be 
'<> Subercaseaux (1922), p. 121. 
" Subercaseaux (1912), pp. 260-261. 
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deposited in the banks for future governmental use. Bemg the market exchange 
rate much lower and the gold given in exchange for ñscal notes not returnable. 
the operation was not profitable and thus not performed, henee the authormes 
deposited twenty million pesos in the banks. . fíW .^r.^nt 
In 1906 the monetary base rose by forty milhon pesos, almost fifty percent 
while the nominal money stock grew by 28.8 percent. ^ s «me pnces rose by 33^ 
percentandtheexchangeratedepreciatedby8.65percentBesidesj^^snflaU^^^^^^^ 
impact the new issue postponed the bursting of the speculative bubble and bank impací, tne n F F ^.^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ¿^¿ ^^^ 
reserves were restored to í).í perccm i<i" r>„„„.t,vinfpr 
«duce the interest t . K mo„e, ente,=d th . economy ,s mone, t.m. 0 » ™ ° •"»'^ 
es, m e rose 0.18 poin». while ,he spre.d rose ,o 3.92 percentaje po,n s . ' .The 
c . . r k e . bubble b.rs,, in part .s . conse<,„er,ce .he • » » ™ " ° ™ ' / ' - ^ 
1,07/8. There . e r e s o . e ba„k ' ^ ^ - - ^ ^ Z ^ x X ' P ^ ^ t ' T ^ ^ 
interest rate, spread and exchange rate (see laDie A) ine 8 r 
„as a new issue of thtrt, milhon pesos in ^ " - ^ ' ' ' " ' • ^ " ^ ^ ' ^ ^ 
introduced through an open market operaran: ,he T « » » ' T ' " " ¿ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' f 
bonds. The mone.ary base rose .0 150.5 milhon pesos and the nommal mone, 
stock reached 479.9 milhon p e s o s _ i , o v _ pohcy makers postponed 
pohc, induced an tnves.men, boom, ^ - ' ¿ » « " « ' ^ ' ' ^ „ 7 J 2 „ ' r h t 
pnces ™se bv more * ¿ ° _ ^ ' f „ ' ' X « , ^ 1 2 1 a w.ve of social unrest. In 
S r ^ t o - Í X T c ^ r i * A f . - S a n t i a g o t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
r,0, suppressed by the Army. State •f^^^J^^lX.^J^^c^JXL 
mandtngtheirwagesto epa, .nPes^^^^^^^ 
government.Thesaddestolthesemciae í'^' , , l^ jU d^ ¡„ ,l,e 
1907, where 200 P»P'= - ™ " ; , : r i y " j t ^ ^ n t r a t ^ waiting for the 
Presidente Santa Mana School where tney ñau 
government's response to their demands. 
6. SOBRIETY REGAINED: 1909-1925 
1 u- u u^acn in 1905 was already subsiding by the 
The mflationary episode -^fj^^^l^rnc increasingly opposed to a 
second half of 1908. Pubhc and pohticians t^ eca 
" , f 1906 an earthquake destroyed large sections of 
•» It should be mentioned that in A"g"" i^^ortant port created enough activity to absorb 
Valparaíso. I. is likely that/econstructu^n of th - „ p ^^^^ _^^^^^ 
part of the new monetary issue and thus reauceu 
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monetary policy consisting of lump-sum increases of the monetary base whenever 
banks ran out of reserves. Consequently, the law authorizing the 1907 money issue 
also estabUshed the Oficina de Emisión. Its goals were to stabilize the exchange 
rate and to provide elasticity to the circulating media. This agency was to issue 
legal tender notes against gold deposits at a fixed exchange rate of eighteen pence 
per peso. Depositors would receive a nominative but endorsable certifícate stating 
the amount of gold deposited as well as the amount of fiscal notes issued in their 
favor. Depositors could use this certifícate to withdraw their gold by returning the 
same amount of notes originally issue to them. The Ofícina de Emisión, in turn, 
had to destroy the returned notes. There were no restrictions to issue new legal 
tender notes guaranteed by gold, but the already existing 150 million pesos of out-
standing registered fiscal notes remained inconvertible. 
Operating with Oficina de Emisión depended on profítability which, in turn, 
was a function of the market exchange rate and the spread between deomestic and 
international interest rates. At the time this legislation passed, the market exchange 
rate was 10.78 pence per peso, therefore the operation would have been profitable 
if the spread was above fifty-nine percentage points. Consequently, the Oficina de 
Emisión did not function. 
Monetary and banking activities expanded rapidly until 1911. As shown in 
Table XI, this development started from a fixed monetary base, therefore the 
money stock grew only via deposit creation and by reducing the reserve ratio. As 
in other instances, banks began to complain about the scarcity of circulating media 
in 1911. Fetter described the situation as «currency starvation» ". Lack of reserves 
became so acute that in March 1912 Banco de Chile, the country's biggest bank, 
deposited a total of£ 600.000 with the Ofícina de Emisión, obtaining eight million 
pesos to enlarge its reserves ^'^. In addition to the banking crunch, the government 
decided to sell fífty million pesos of mortgage bonds it owned thus depressing 
their price and raising the domestic interest rate ^^. Banks trying to accumulate 
reserves plus the government selling bonds generated a monetary contraction that 
weakened overall business activity. (See Table XII). 
To no one surprise banks asked the government for help, but this time public 
opinión was against lump-sum issues of currency. The authorities modified some 
regulations of the Oficina de Emisión: (1) the parity was set at twelve pence, (2) 
banks had to increase their gold deposits in case of appreciation and (3) banks 
could obtain notes up to the valué of their net worth. 
" Fetter(1931), p. 127. 
2» Fetter(1931), p. 128. 
21 Martner (1923), p. 617. 
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TABLE XI 
Banking Indkators: 1909-1925 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances December 31) 
Year 
1909 ''''°' 
1910 " • 
1911 ^5,42 
1912 ' ' ' ' ' ' 
1913 ' ' ' ' ' ' 
1914.1 ' ' ' ' ' ' 
1914.2 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
1915 " ' 5 8 7 
" ' 68,378 
• : : : : : ; : : ; : : : : : : : : : : : : H 4 1 3 
99,371 
\Z •:;;: : : : : ; ; ; ; ; : : : ; : : ; ; : : : : : : : : : : : : ii8;o74 
920 151,962 
l«l-70^ 
922 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
• • ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
9 2 4 • • • ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
;::: '''•''' 
Deposits-
reserve 
Reserves Loam Deposits ratio 
484,559 
537,047 
706,292 
673,117 
684,324 
639,812 
629,708 
654,146 
646,462 
729,420 
971,103 
1,150,776 
1,344,373 
1,480,532 
1,535,244 
1,651,057 
1,685,690 
1,614,288 
370,814 
447,195 
527,082 
490,188 
491,390 
442,998 
510,503 
521,561 
529,049 
584,294 
924,884 
1,031,997 
1,133,791 
1,282,274 
1,198,933 
1,298,137 
1,207,816 
1,236,487 
0.17 
0.12 
0.09 
0.11 
0.13 
0.15 
0.20 
0.14 
0.13 
0.13 
0.11 
0.11 
0.13 
0.14 
0.12 
0.11 
0.11 
0.14 
SOURCE: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Poltcy, Appendix C. 
thirteen percent in 1913. f,,nctioning of the Caja permitted a 
From an insütutional point o v i ew>e ^ - - - ¿ ^ ^ ^ ^ . . . ^ I , , , ^ ^ ,he 
less strident discussion of the possib.hty to retur ^^ ^ 
establising the Caja de Convers.oa Tbs agency ^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ 
but under a gold exchange «^^^^ard rath r tha" p ^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ 
fulfilled the needs of the economy. The outbreak ot w P 
in this direction. outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 
The short-run consequences of the outweaK 
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were disastrous for Chile: the nitrate market coUapsed, reducing government 
revenues and generating a fiscal crisis of dramatic proportions. On the monetary 
side, there was a quasi-financial panic as people withdrew their deposits from 
commercial banks, especially those of Germán ownership. Nitrate producers 
paralyzed their activities and laid off thousand of miners. With the major industry 
of the country on the verge of closing and banks becoming rapidly insolvent, the 
administration acted rapidly to help both bankers and miners. It prometed legislation 
to keep the level of nitrate production at pre-war levéis and to help banks. 
TABLE XII 
Monetary Policy Indicators: 1909-1923 
(ThousandCurrent Pesos, Balances December31 (\)) 
Year 
High 
powered 
money 
1909 150,251 
1910 150,324 
1911 150,848 
1912 170,904 
1913 186,041 
1914.1 184,241 
1914.2 224,980 
1915 177,712 
1916 178,908 
1917 186,162 
1918 227,688 
1919 250,781 
1920 302,822 
1921 324,631 
1922 301,958 
1923 295,503 
1924 336,265 
1925 393,697 
Nominal 
money 
stock 
Domestic 
interest 
rate Spread 
Non-traded 
price 
Índex (2) 
Exchange 
rate 
$/£ 
459,257 
544,588 
632,505 
607,474 
613,032 
576,041 
631,579 
625,686 
639,581 
696,043 
1,053,201 
1,164,704 
1,284,651 
1,425,200 
1,355,639 
1,452,715 
1,411,848 
1,454,617 
7.43 
7.00 
6.89 
7.70 
8.55 
8.92 
n. a. 
8.95 
8.40 
8.27 
8.13 
7.04 
7.47 
7.69 
7.39 
7.36 
7.83 
8.01 
4.45 
3.92 
3.70 
4.42 
5.16 
5.46 
n. a. 
5.13 
4.09 
3.69 
3.73 
2.42 
2.15 
2.48 
2.96 
3.05 
3.44 
3.58 
91.51 
94.06 
95.69 
92.01 
100.00 
108.37 
n. a. 
140.13 
124.83 
150.40 
145.71 
165.30 
197.90 
172.91 
182.02 
180.33 
184.97 
228.61 
22.26 
22.26 
22.59 
23.70 
24.61 
24.53 
28.15 
29.09 
25.35 
18.85 
16.45 
22.68 
19.88 
32.80 
36.55 
37.07 
41.45 
40.99 
NOTES: 
(1) Monetary figures for 1914 are balances at June 30 and December 31, exchange rate figures are 
monthly averages for June and December. 
(2) This price Índex intends to capture non-traded goods price level, from 1899 until 1908 it in-
cludes, with equal weights, twelve agricultura! commodities; from 1908 until 1925 the index is a 
weighted average between the previous one and a wholesale price index for manufactures; the 
weights are given by the relative importance in production of the two sectors. 
SoURCES: Same as Table X. 
148 
CHILEAN MONETARY HISTORY, 1860-1925 AN OVERVIEW 
To help the banks Congress authorized the issue of Treasury Notes in favor of 
the banks. These notes were legal tender to be used in any transact.on. Banks had 
to satisíy the following conditions to obtain notes: (1) they had to pay interest on 
those notes set at three percentage points lower than their lending rate, (2) they 
had to guarantee this issue with mortgage bonds and/or goyernment bonds but 
these bonds would be valued at ninety percent of their market quotat.on and (3) 
they could receive Treasury notes up to fifty percent of their net worth Although 
this law was intended to last one year, it operated until the foundation of the Cen-
tral Bank in 1925. This open market operation was similar to the one performed 
during the 1880s, but more costly: the Treasury charged not only mterest but 
received the guarantee at ninety percent of its market valué. Subercaseaux clajms 
that this operation was very expensive for the banks, particularly because they 
were not lending these additional funds but increasing the.r reserves ^ _ 
To help hard-pressed nitrate producers to keep production levéis, the autho-
rities implemented a special lending program. It consisted «^ 8 ^ - " " ^ ^ « ^ ^ ^ ^ 
of $ 87 per metric ton ready to export and $ 65 per metric ton processed m pl nuo 
all producers who agreed to keep their mines runnmg. The loans ^^^J^^^^^^ 
form of letters of credit issued by the Treasury with mtrate as guarantee. These 
Instruments of credit could be discounted by the banks and they could use these 
letters of credit as collateral for obtaining Treasury notes 
As shown by Table XII, financial markets --/^^"^^^.^^V^n^^^^^^^^ 
exchange rate depreciated from $ 25.26 per pound m July to $ 31.57 m December 
914 the stock of loans shrank; the interest rate rose to 8.93 percent, and the San-
ia o and Valparaíso Stock Exchanges had to cióse for a few days to avo.d <<a de^ 
mo^ralisation o^f the market brought about b H^e - s s a r . , ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
foreign exchange and - - - ; - ; ; / ^ ^ ; ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , , .illion pounds of 
during August and September. The 8°^^™"^^" ^ ^^^^ g , „ , „ Español and 
its own funds in the Caja de ^ ^^^^^^'^.^f^^^^^^^^^ 
BancoNacional thelargestcommer^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^^.^^ ^^^^^ 
obtam thirty milhon pesos ^ ^ ^ ^^e Ca,a • ^^^ ^^^^^^^ 
momhs Treasury notes m c.rculation ^^^^ed ^4^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^, , , „ , 
r e v e ^ ^ ^ ^ e ' p u b H c r'egained - ^ - ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Z ^ ^ : ^ ^ ^ ^ 
government's willingness to act as lender of last resort. In Uecem 
" Subercaseaux (1922), p. 158. 
" Subercaseaux (1922), p. 156. 
» Fetter (1931), p. 137; Martner (1923), p. 622. 
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increased reserves to reach a reserve ratio of twenty percent, an unusual figure in 
Chilean history (see Table XI). 
The nitrate market began to improve by the end of 1915. From there on Chilean 
economic situation began to strengthen and commercial banks started to expand 
again. As in previous periods, banks expanded by reducing their reserve ratio, 
instead of using the newly established mechanisms to expand the monetary 
base. Table XII shows that by 1918 the reserve ratio had fallen to 10.7 percent. It 
was certainly less expensive to increase the credit multiplier instead of performing 
open market operations or depositing gold at the Caja de Emisión. 
From 1914 to 1918 operations through Caja de Emisión explain more than 
eighty-five percent of the changes in the monetary base. In 1914 these operations 
were the second source of expansión and in 1915 the primary source of contraction. 
The explanation, at least for thirty million pesos is the loan given by the government 
to the banks in August-September 1914, that the banks paid back in 1915. Although 
this operation was profitable during the war years, Table XIII indicates that it was 
not widely used. This was due to the foUowing causes: (1) once the war started Inter-
national capital mobility was severely restrained, in particular gold flows, moreover 
the United Kingdom and France abandoned the gold standard, the only place 
where Chilean banks could obtain gold was New York, a financia! center with poor 
ties to Chile then and (2) Caja de Emisión regulations required the banks to increase 
their gold deposits whenever the exchange rate rose above twelve pence ($ 20 per 
pound), furthermore, additional deposits had to be made physically in gold. The 
nominal exchange rate appreciated by almost thirteen percent from 1915 to 1916, 
by the second quarter of 1917 the paper peso had risen to 12.362 pence ($ 19.41 per 
pound), in December 1917 it reached 14.5 pence ($ 16.55 per pound) and in June 
1918 it was at 17.2 pence ($ 13.95), i.e., the paper peso was quoted at almost par with 
the mythical gold peso of eighteen pence. Banks had to supplement their original 
gold deposits to meet the market exchange rate, but this operation proved very 
expensive as the price of gold skyrocketed in terms of the now devalued pound. In 
1917 the Chilean gold coin of 0.599103 grams —the gold peso of eighteen pence— 
was quoted at 20.07 pence, in June 1918 at 23.70 pence and in December 1918 at 
21.12 pence. To keep the Caja de Emisión working, the authorities modified its 
operation allowing any person to opérate with the agency, but more important they 
established that in case of withdrawal deposits could be paid in bilis of exchange 
over London or Santiago. At the time the gold coin in Chile was worth twenty-six 
pence and in London only eighteen pence. It became impossible then for the 
currency to appreciate beyond eighteen pence because it was always possible to 
obtain bilis of exchange on London at eighteen pence. Table XI shows that this 
modification permitted banks to obtain 45.6 million pesos from the Caja. 
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TABLE XIII 
Sources ofMonetary Base: 1914-1925 
(Thousand ofCurrent Pesos, Balances December 31) 
Year 
Caja de 
emisión 
Open 
market 
operations 
Nitrate 
program 
Bank 
notes 
,914 11,157 6.880 
1915 . . . . -32,946 3,090 
1916 : : : : : : : : : : : ^,094 -9,696 
1917 6,753 7.529 
,9,8 .. 45,689 -7,097 
Z:::::::::;:::::;::: -0,483 «79 
1920 -12.258 29.643 
1921 -39,743 44,864 
,922 ... -1.960 -7,526 
,923 .... 11.300 38.145 
. 9 2 4 : : : ; : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : -750 49.201 
1925 -2.260 65.784 
SOURCE: A. Liona. Chtlean Monetary Poltcy, p. 246 and p. 257. 
21.256 
-17.405 
4,857 
-7 ,029 
2.935 
36.624 
34,656 
16.689 
-13,187 
-58,720 
-4,876 
-6,164 
-353 
-12 
-47 
-1 
-1 
- 9 2 7 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
Change in 
monetary 
base 
38.940 
-47.273 
1.208 
7.252 
41.526 
23.093 
52,041 
21.810 
-22,673 
-9,275 
43,575 
57,360 
As mendoned earlier, open market operations - ^ ' ^ - f ¿ . ^ . " ^ ^ ^ ^ j j ! ^ 
oroved to be rather dear if performed to increase reserves or pay back deposits. n 
proved to be ratner ac F Treasury notes were returned to 
iQii; nnrp fhp rrsis oí was over, aimost au L"c i i<-a^  y 
1916, once the crisis °'^ ' ^.^n had a positive impact on the 
the Treasury, as shown in T^ble XIII. J h « °P^ ^^ ^ ^^^^^ ¿ue to the 
.onetary base in 1917, wh^ nba^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
expansión of the economy. With respect to tn j 
source of expansión of the monetary base in 1914, but its ettect 
reverse by December 1915. benefitted from the war. Nitrate is used 
Contrary to initial - P - ^ " - ¿ '^ '^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ,oared: the average amount 
in the P-ducdon of gun-powder ther f^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^  ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ , . j ^ ^,^ 
of nitrate exponed from^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
average for 1909 to 1913 was oniy /^  oimtriit^ to reach 
by France. the Umted Kingdom and he USA dlowe p ^^^^ _^ ^^^^^ 
historical heights:in 1917 it wasquot d U ^ ^ ^ P^ ^ Consequently. 
of pounds of purchasing power of 1913 is equai to t. F 
GDP rose by almost twenty P - - " ^ fr^^^/J^^^^^ 
Although the price level rose in 1915, it remamc 
151 
AGUSTÍN LLONA RODRÍGUEZ 
explained by a combination of three factors: (1) an enormous increase in output, 
(2) an almost constant money supply in nominal and real terms and (3) a strong 
appreciation of the exchange rate. 
This picture of prosperity carne crashing down with the collapse of the nitrate 
and copper markets in 1919. Table XIV shows that not only prices of these 
commodities fell by more than sixty percent in real terms, but the volume of exports 
dropped by a record figure: copper by twenty-three percent and nitrate by 
seventy-three percent. This grim picture improved somewhat during 1920, but it 
deteriorated again in 1922. The share of copper in exports began to increase 
rapidly in 1922 while that of nitrate to fall. The real price of nitrate never reached 
the level of 1913 and nitrate exports increased only by volume expansión. 
TABLE XIV 
Copper and Nitrate Exports: 1916-1922 
Year 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
£/ton 
(1) 
90.37 
104.82 
93.14 
51,99 
86.80 
52.74 
55.87 
Copper 
C/ton 
(2) 
70.93 
65.06 
65.06 
23.10 
32.05 
21.74 
27.47 
Exports 
(tons) 
71,904 
94,987 
92,534 
71,002 
85,165 
53,426 
120,330 
l/ton 
(1) 
8.52 
12.75 
13.12 
10.91 
14.41 
17.25 
10.27 
Nitrate 
£/ton 
(2) 
6.69 
7.92 
6.87 
4.85 
5.32 
7.12 
5.05 
Exports 
(Thousarid 
tons) 
2,980 
2,776 
2,919 
804 
2,746 
1,193 
1,252 
NOTES: 
(1) Prices in Chile expressed in current pounds. 
(2) Pounds with purchasing power of 1913. 
SoURCE: Prices from A. Liona op. cit., pp. 27-30. Volume of exports: Sinopsis Geográfica y Estadística, 
several issues. 
One of the consequences of the external crisis was a sharp depreciation of the 
peso with respect to pound and the American dollar. Table XV indicates that the 
Chilean peso depreciated in 1919 by thirty-eight percent with respect to the 
pound and by fifty percent with respect to the American dollar. From an economic 
point of view the evolution of the real effective exchange rate is more important 
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because it gives an idea of the reallocation of resources as a consequence of the 
crisis. The real exchange rate for the period 1919/25 is twenty-nine percent below 
the average for the 1913/18 period. 
TABLE XV 
Nominal and Real Exchange Rate: 1913-1925 
Year 
Real effeclive 
exchange rate 
$/í $/US$ (1) 
24.62 5.12 1.00 
1^1^ 26.76 5.74 1.05 
1^1'' 2909 6.07 1.02 
1^^5 ; 25.35 5.37 1.26 
1^1^ 1885 4.07 1.06 
1^17 16.45 3.47 1.07 
1^1^ 22.68 5.21 1.43 
1919 19.89 5.73 1.25 
1920 32 80 8.84 1-51 
1921 3655 8.41 1.36 
1922 3707 8.21 1.37 
1923 4145 9.29 1.51 
1924 4099 8.55 UO 
1925 
^ T l ) Real effective exchange .ate = Nominal exchange ra«^^^^^^^^^^ -erage of trade p a n n e . 
price indexes/Chilean wholesale price mdex of non-traded sectors. 
LKCES:Nom.nal exchange rates:5,«op..G«,..^^^^^^^ 
The fall of the terms of trade reduced disposable ir.corne.At the same time the 
1 he tan or tne icru« aenerated a flow of unemployed 
closit^g of the mtrate mmes & « - f j « j ° f ^ ^ f ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ,hese circumstat^ces the 
migrantsfromthenorthernprovmce t o S w U ^ ^ ^ ^,^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
socio- political situation became ^ " ^ fo, ,heir losing of j o ^ 
tested for their falHng income evels an^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
clinir^g real wages Jr , this social ^^J^:'^^lZLnán. The new administration 
inthetriumphofthepopuhstcar.didate. A^^ ^^ ^^  ¿^^^^^ 
had to face serious pohtical problems ' 1 ^ " ^ ; ' \ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^hile the political 
Tlie President's legislative P^o^T:^\'^2lt^^namonthafterinau-
climate became increasingly tense. In January i^zi, 
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guration, a strike in the north was brutally repressed by the army. Workers were 
protesting the closing of the Oficina San Gregorio. In a confuse episode, 130 
people were killed including «workers, women and children.» 2' The government 
tried to censor news on the incident, but once it became publicly known it had to 
face serious demonstrations and near riots throughout the country. Political tensión 
mounted, fueled in part by the authoritarian character of Mr. Alessandri that 
made compromising quite difficuh. Finally on September 11, 1924 a bloodless 
coup d'etat interrupted almost one hundred years of constitutional rule. In 1925, 
the military unable to run the country had to cali Mr. Alessandri back. During the 
last year of his administration two important reforms took place: (1) a new 
constitution changed the political system from a parliamentarian one to a 
presidential one and (2) a set of economic reforms included the establishment of 
the Central Bank and the adoption of the gold exchange standard. 
From 1919 to 1925 monetary policy was almost completely dominated by the 
crisis, especially its fiscal component. It could have not been otherwise; in 1919 the 
déficit reached 30.4 percent of expenditures, in 1920-1922, 18.7, 40,5 and 36.8 
respectively. In terms of the GDP, these percentages are: 2.89, 1.72, 6.05 and 4.84 
respectively. The authorities had no alternatives but to borrow from the private 
sector. They did so by issuing médium term bonds in the domestic market. But 
borrowing was not enough and for the first time since 1879, the government had to 
issue notes for financing a fiscal déficit. The size of the déficit and the populist 
character of the administration made it politically impossible to address the fiscal 
crisis through contractionary policy measures: higher taxes and lower expenditures. 
The issue of domestic public debt contributed to an increase in the monetary 
base. As shown in Table XIII from 1920 to 1925 the main source of expansión of 
high powered money was open market operations. A second source of issue was 
the nitrate program, reestablished in 1919. It was an important source of issue up 
to 1921, but once the nitrate market stabilized in 1922, it began to work as a 
contractionary forcé. Money issue through Caja de Emisión resulted in a contraction 
of the monetary base. In November 1918 the government forbade gold exports; 
besides, for those who had deposited gold or bilis of exchange and obtain notes at 
eighteen pence, the operation had turned unprofitable. By 1925 the amount of 
notes guaranteed by gold deposits was reduced to thirteen million pesos. 
Domestic price level was really jittery from 1919 to 1922. The consumer price 
Índex shows inflation rates of 5.7 and 8.6 percent in 1924 and 1925, which are in 
part a response to the move toward closing the economy, thus allowing industrial 
prices to rise above their International level. 
" Castedo (1982), p. 861. 
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Th. ct.a,¡on of .he centrnl b.nk is one of th . majo, .ccomplishmenK of Ais 
proposuions wcrc nuu Tonaress The Kemmerer mission recom-
mists, but never seriously considered by Congress. i ne rve 
mended: (1) the establishment of a Centra Bank w,th the - ^ P ^ ^ ^ f^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
ag.nst golddepositsor bilis o f e x c h a n g e — ^ ^ ^ ^ 
,2) the par rate was ^ ^ / / J f J ^ ^ ^ / r X ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l e ^ t ^ o n which 
market exchange rate the time, (:>; tne rciui RonUnoSnnerintendencv 
in charge of fiscalizing banks' accounts. These retorms werc y 
Bank open its doors to the public in 1926. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
^ o major .ssues do.inated C H ^ ^ — ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ S : : ^ 
powered money and (2) regulat.on of ^'^^2oZc2.nac rL regime. Chile's 
independent and they are also closely relatad to * " ; ™ ^ g^ld 
definite solution was the establishment of a central b^^^^'the adopnon o g 
exchange standard and the - « ^ ^ «^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
banks- portfolio management. « « ' ' ^ " . ^ ^ ^ e p o s l r e s e r v e rate and it also be-
bank had the power to set the legal or mmimum deposit ^^s 
came the lender of last resource. ^ - ^ - ^ [ X ' ^ Z ^ l ^ ^ L c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
signed to ensure financial stability by shiftmg to the centr 
with external and domestic shocks. ^^^^ inconsistent, 
From 1860 to 1924 there were «^^^^^\P™'^5 ' ' ' , i „d3 1818/1860-1878 and 
thus bringing financial crises. The two gold s - ^ a r d P^^^^^^^^^^^  18 J ^^  ^ ^^  ^ ,^^ 
1895-1898, did have severe ^-<^^^^''^^¿'^jZá.r¿ requires setting a mini-
der of last resort, financial stab.hty under ^^^ g ° ™ ^^^^ ,^ ^^ ^ 
mumspeaebackmgfornotesan a m — ^ 
banks include in their profít Mct.on '"^^^'^^^ ,he government does not have 
by the existence of a lender o last ^ ^ ; ^ ^ ' ^ ' ^ Z V , , „ n ^ , e d liabiUty, banks toguaranteethesolvencyofthebanks,mthatcaseandg^^^^^^^^^^^^ .^ ^ 
should be left free to set both, backing -^^ t^^ de^os, - s^^^^^^^  , ^^^^^ ,^^  ^ ^^^^ 
penaHze nsk-love bankers vis a v.s "sk-averse one b d - o g ^^^^ 
By accepting bank notes in tax payments -'^^ou' d ^ " ^ ^ ^ banks reduce 
became guarantors of the banking system .^«"f ""^- f^°^ ^ v e n T 
their backing and reserve ratios to the pomt of becommg msolvent. 
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Under paper money consistency requirements are less stringent, financial sta-
bility is guaranteed by the existence of a smooth mechanism for the creation of 
high powered money. Ideally this mechanism should be market regulated instead 
of discretionary changes in the base. The backing requirement for bank notes in 
mortgage bonds is a good example of this regime. During this period, there was no 
need for a central bank ñor for a lender of last resort and the system enjoyed six-
teen years of remarkable stability. The economy fared well and did not endure the 
contractionary consequences of the retirement of fiscal notes. The cost of this 
regime was domestic inflation. Inflation and the ideological commitment to 
convertibility forced the authorities to abandon paper in favor of gold with the 
consequences describes in section three. 
A paper money regime without a smooth mechanism for the creation of high 
powered money plus the banks' certainty of the government acting as lender of 
last resort is not stable. Banks, knowing that the government would come to their 
rescue, increased the money supply by reducing the deposit-reserve ratio to the 
edge of insolvency. 
A paper money regime with a variety of mechanisms for the creation of high 
powered money, like the one from 1912 to 1924 proved very solid. It survived 
WWI and the postwar depression. But the regime could not survive a different 
inconsistency, that of keeping a stable price level with a rising budget déficit. 
Domestic inflation, added to a renewed world commitment to the gold standard 
made the establishment of the central bank cum gold standard possible. 
Finally, regarding the exchange regime, the most important requirements for a 
fix exchange rate regime to work is price flexibility, absolute and relative. The wish 
list also includes a relatively stable external sector. Domestic prices were not as 
flexible as required at least at times when flexibility was a necessity and the econ-
omy suffered not only from severe external shocks, but from 1880 until 1898 
terms of trade secularly declined at a rate of 2.5 percent per year. Under a fix ex-
change regime, domestic prices need to undergo deflation to accommodate falling 
terms of trade, it seems unrealistic to expect domestic deflation at a rate of 2.5 per-
cent per year during eighteen years. 
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